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| Date: |
January 26, 2011 (Wednesday) |
| Time : |
2:30pm - 4:00pm |
| Language : |
English |
| Venue : |
Room 617, Meng Wah Complex |
| Presented By : |
Ms. Fei Du, Ph. D. Candidate in Accounting, Leventhal School of Business, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California |
| Seminar title : |
Political Connections and Access to Bond Capital: Reputation or Collusion? |
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| Abstract: |
| This study addresses how political connections influence a firm’s access to bond capital using a database of 1672 new bond issuances in China from 2001 to 2009. In this context, firm political connections are measured using a score based on the highest bureaucratic position held by a firm executive, with the highest level of political connections attributed to those who have held top positions in the central government, followed by those in provincial and municipal governments. Results suggest that firm political connections are positively associated with debt offering amounts and issuer credit ratings, but only in the subsample of firms with poor information environments, such as non-publicly listed firms and non-Beijing headquartered firms, thus lending support to the argument that political connections contribute to firm reputation. The role of political connections in providing preferential access to debt is relevant to both state-owned enterprises and privately held firms. In addition, issuing firm political connections and bank underwriter political connections serve as alternative mechanisms when explaining the variation of offering amounts and issuer credit ratings.
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| All Interested are Welcomed: |
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Request for presentation papers or enquires, please contact:
Miss Panda Tsu
Tel: 2241 5050 or pandatsu@business.hku.hk
The papers will also be available on the presentation. |
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